



**ROSA  
LUXEMBURG  
STIFTUNG**  
NEW YORK OFFICE

# ALTERNATIVES TO WAR

Civil Conflict Management in the Context of International Politics

By Andreas Buro

## Table of Contents

Give Peace A Chance. By the Editors.....1

### Alternatives to War

**Civil Conflict Management in the Context of International Politics.....2**

By Andreas Buro

Foundations of Analysis:

I. The Consequences of the Military Resolution of Conflict.....3  
II. What Does Civil Conflict Management Mean and Comprise?.....5  
III. To Which Political Institutions Can Civil Conflict Management Relate?.....7

Perspectives on Civil Conflict Management:

I. The State of Civil Conflict Management in Contemporary International Politics.....8  
    Domestic Conflicts.....9  
    International Conflicts.....12  
II. Resistance to Civil Conflict Management That Must Be Reckoned With.....15  
III. Strategies and Elements of Civil Conflict Management.....17

Conclusion.....23

Published by the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, New York Office, January 2013

**Editors:** Stefanie Ehmsen and Albert Scharenberg  
**Address:** 275 Madison Avenue, Suite 2114, New York, NY 10016  
**Email:** info@rosalux-nyc.org; **Phone:** +1 (917) 409-1040

The Rosa Luxemburg Foundation is an internationally operating, progressive non-profit institution for civic education. In cooperation with many organizations around the globe, it works on democratic and social participation, empowerment of disadvantaged groups, alternatives for economic, and social development, and peaceful conflict resolution.

The New York Office serves two major tasks: to work around issues concerning the United Nations and to engage in dialogue with North American progressives in universities, unions, social movements and politics.

**[www.rosalux-nyc.org](http://www.rosalux-nyc.org)**

## Give Peace A Chance

Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz once wrote that, “War is just a continuation of politics by other means.”

Two hundred years later, President Barack Obama said that war “is sometimes necessary”—ironically, while accepting the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo.

The opinion-makers in the media rushed to his defense: Today’s military deployments are in essence no longer even wars, they say, but “humanitarian actions” that the West engages in to selflessly aid oppressed people around the world. And the television networks seldom broadcast images of the cruelty of war anymore, as they once did from Vietnam. Instead, today’s journalists report from the front while “embedded” in the military. Correspondingly, there are no “bombardments” anymore, but only “surgical interventions.”

The fact that war is equated with medical procedures that are meant to heal is a particularly drastic illustration that George Orwell’s slogan “war is peace” from 1984 has come to bear. Recall that it continues, “Freedom is slavery. Ignorance is strength.”

When ideas are blurred in an Orwellian sense such that bombs are meant to be instruments of healing, we can safely assume that ideologues are at work, ideologues who are not concerned with portraying a reasonable image of reality, but rather with justifying wars. We can also assume that the belligerents’ real interests—be they material, geopolitical, or other—are not being mentioned. Instead, those who are responsible for going to war are awarded the mantle of selflessness, and even humanism.

That is why the fairy tale that “there is no alternative” plays a central part in the current discussions around war. Apparently there is no alternative to violent conflict—not in Serbia/Kosovo, not in Afghanistan, not in Iraq, not in Libya. We are inclined to believe not anywhere.

Andreas Buro, Professor Emeritus of International Politics at the Goethe University Frankfurt and long-time German peace activist who will be awarded the 2013 Peace Prize of the City of Göttingen, contests this apparent legitimacy. In his study, he argues that there are always alternatives—and the alternative to war is called Civil Conflict Resolution.

Buro shows the consequences of military conflict and develops the basis for civil conflict resolution against that backdrop. He discusses political institutions that can apply the methods of civil conflict resolution today, but also the opposition to it in international politics. His central question is: What must be done to end the age of war and begin the age of civil conflict resolution?

*Stefanie Ehmsen and Albert Scharenberg  
Co-Directors of New York Office, January 2013*

# Alternatives to War

## Civil Conflict Management in the Context of International Politics

By Andreas Buro

Why has a Greek philosopher named Heraclitus (ca. 520–460 B.C.), whose work is only transmitted in fragments, become so famous through a single statement which is only partly quoted? The sentence is: “War is the father of all.” It is constantly repeated in the sense that war is the motor of progress, which one cannot do without. Aside from the question of whether the correct translation is not: “*Conflict* is the father of all,” Heraclitus’ important addition is suppressed. It reads: “It makes some into gods, others into people, some into slaves and others into freemen.” With this addition Heraclitus’ utterance takes on a whole new meaning. It can no longer be read as an affirmation of war, for it also implies war crimes and enormous destruction—typically downplayed as “collateral damage.” If we further take into account that Heraclitus was not necessarily speaking of war but probably about conflicts, then the question arises whether conflicts, which would inevitably always exist, could not be resolved without terrible wars. Or, conceived differently, whether the “motor of progress” cannot better be sought in common effort rather than in mutual battles. In short: the selectively used and possibly incorrect translation of the 2,500-year old quote is apparently nothing more than a PR legitimization for further armaments and the use of military force.

History is a quarry for arguments justifying war, however doubtful the historical interpretation may be that transmits the quarry stones. We read, for example, that the shots fired by Gavrilo Princip at the heir to the throne of Austria in Sarajevo triggered the First World

War, although Germany’s army command, and probably also the Kaiser, had already planned to attack in order to stop the rise of Russia. They were only waiting for a good pretext that would allow them to pin the blame for the war on Russia.<sup>1</sup>

Alongside the legitimization of war there have historically always been attempts to delegitimize it or at least to contain it. In the last century there were two highly significant attempts to do so. First, the founding of the League of Nations in 1920, in other words shortly after the end of the First World War, whose task was to mediate conflicts, to oversee compliance with peace treaties (a kind of monitoring), and to promote cooperation between countries. Furthermore, a system of “collective security,” as we would say today, was agreed upon. However, the United States withheld its support from the League of Nations, and the different interests of the nation-states could not be reined in by it. It finally collapsed in the Second World War.

The second attempt was the founding of the United Nations after the end of the Second World War. This time the USA did participate and played a significant role. The Preamble of the 1945 UN Charter spelled out the fundamental aims of this group of countries:

*We the peoples of the United Nations determined: to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith*

---

<sup>1</sup> I am grateful to Prof. Hanne-Margret Birckenbach and Dr. Volker Böge for their suggestions and criticisms.

*in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, and for these ends: to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples, have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims.*

These were the goals and tasks, although in what followed they could not be realized. The East-West conflict pushed them to the margins. Even after its end, they hardly came any nearer to realization. Succeeding generations have still not been saved from the scourge of war. Most national states, which want to organize peace, still see the military as important, if not as the most important instrument for carrying out their interests. In addition, the UN Charter does not exclude military deployment as the *ultima ratio*. A fateful decision, as seen in the Iraq, Afghanistan and Libyan Wars. The UN can no longer control the dele-

gated military interventions when, with their own rationales and momentums, they pursue goals quite different from the prescribed ones.

The great number of violent conflicts worldwide is shown by the annually published Conflict Barometer of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIK).<sup>2</sup> In 2010, of a total of 363 observed conflicts, 126 were armed and 28 were carried out at a high level of violence, that is, with the massive deployment of organized violence. The Institute's figures impressively demonstrate the rise of conflicts of various degrees of intensity from 1945 to 2010. With nine high-violence confrontations each, the Near and Middle East, as well as Asia, followed by Sub-Saharan Africa with five such confrontations, are the most strongly affected regions in the world.

This paper looks at the form and consequences of international conflict resolution. How can civil conflict management—an important postulate of the UN—be advanced and the military resolution of conflicts, with its devastating suffering and damage be pushed back and finally overcome? In three sections the bases for a politics of civil conflict management (CCM) will be treated; the next three sections involve prospects for CCM.

## Foundations for Analysis:

### I. The Consequences of the Military Resolution of Conflict

The famous 19<sup>th</sup>-century military theorist Carl von Clausewitz wrote:

*War is an act of violence, which in its application knows no bounds; as one dictates the law to the other, there arises a sort of reciprocal action, which in the conception, must lead to an extreme.<sup>3</sup>*

The accuracy of his assertion is shown by the wars of the 20<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> centuries, with their unfathomable and still

<sup>2</sup> Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, *Conflict Barometer 2010*, Heidelberg 2011, <http://hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer>.

<sup>3</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On the Nature of War* (1832).

growing destructive potential, and also with the extension of the terrain of battle of land, sea, and air warfare to so-called cyber war and outer space.

The military resolution of conflicts kills and leaves behind destroyed landscapes and devastated societies, and frequently creates new enmities that lead to protracted civil wars—as in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989 or in Nicaragua in 1981–1990. Steps toward reconciliation and cooperation—as we have seen in Kosovo—become very difficult, and there is a constant danger of relapse.

The preparation for military conflict resolutions enforces a permanent escalation of armaments, both quantitatively and qualitatively, in which the reciprocal threat is constantly aggravated, and in turn drives the arms buildup forward. In this way a self-reinforcing military buildup arises. Military expenditures cause great financial burdens—with an average of 2.6% of the global gross domestic product.<sup>4</sup> At the same time most states fail to bring their development aid even up to the rate of 0.7%, which has been repeatedly agreed upon in the United Nations.

The military apparatuses, which are normally better financially endowed than other institutions, have together with the arms industry the means to control the political conditions of their further growth. This has in many countries favored the establishment of military dictatorships that have not only impeded democratization processes but have enabled the enrichment of elites at the cost of the population. In order to secure their position, they organize militias, secret services, and torture camps, with which they attempt to crush any resistance to their despotic rule.

---

<sup>4</sup> See the SIPRI Yearbook 2011, *Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, p. 9.

The arms buildup and the waging of war have always required civil preparation for the production of armaments—from the sword to poison gas, nuclear weapons, and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) carried out in many countries serves to extend the use of civil capacity for the carrying out of military objectives and especially for dealing with post-war situations. CIMIC also turns political initiatives, which are oriented to civil conflict prevention, into their opposite. Thus in the German Bundestag the “Civil Conflict Prevention and Networked Security” Subcommittee has, in both prevention and security, been brought into a context of possible military activities. This danger also exists for developmental policy.

The German Development Minister, Dirk Niebel (FDP), threatened NGOs with the withdrawal of financial support if they were not ready to cooperate with the Federal Armed Forces (Bundeswehr). Many of these organizations, however, seek explicitly non-military access to the population in conflict regions, for example in Afghanistan, because they know that only with a civilian approach will they meet with sufficient acceptance and trust in order to help people.

CIMIC thus does not mean a civilizing of the military domain nor a rolling back of military conflict resolution. On the contrary, it involves the subjugation of still more civil domains to the needs of the military and its logic.

Military technology increases inequality in the world. Fighting occurs on extremely different levels: from flintlocks to drones. This has fundamentally altered the forms of war in the last decades. The military technological superiority of the highly industrialized countries, completely out of reach for many others, has led to asymmetrical, diverse forms of war. These battles often transcend the boundaries of existing national borders and tend to spread. The warfare of the technologically weak warring parties

is designated by the USA and NATO as terrorist and is dealt with in the framework of a “war against terror.” This has been expanded into a war without a declaration and without limits. Interventionist forces for foreign missions and drone technology are being expanded for this purpose, in order to carry out military strikes anywhere in the world.

Since this “war against terror” does not increase security, but increases the threat of violent reaction, governments provide for security through police control of the population and the dismantling of democratic rights. The question they ask is: Can people significantly disturb the militarily based policy through protest actions and civil disobedience in pursuit of their economic, social and political interests? Such fears and the consequent security policies tend to contribute to the dismantling of democratic rights and structures, for example in the tightening of laws on demonstrations and in the possibilities for control provided by new media.

In order to legitimize military interventions against one’s better judgment, enemy stereotypes of potential opponents are constructed and propagated. Since it is no longer possible to carry out a dialog with those who have been so branded, peaceful exertion of influence is ruled out. Those who demand civil means of conflict management—for example the peace movement—can thus be discouraged and discriminated against as naïve. These enemy-image mechanisms often victimize even those who were involved in creating such an image. Enemy images in fact lead to a loss of the sense of reality and consequently to seriously flawed as-

sessments of conflicts and their possibilities of resolution and, as a result, to a series of missed opportunities for peacemaking.

Military supported policy, especially that of the larger military powers, increasingly pushes the international institutions, which were created for the purpose of preventing war and promoting cooperation, into the background, or it forces them into unproductive cooperation which follows a military-policy logic. This pertains, for example, to the OECD’s and the UN General Secretary’s likelihood of being effective, especially, in the latter case, when the Security Council is involved.

This dangerous military development is taking place against the background of major global power shifts, in which the so-called BRICS powers (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) are on the rise due to their capacity for economic competitiveness, and their demands on the world’s resources are increasingly being felt. The impact on the climate is making the situation all the more dramatic. Military resolutions of these conflicts would be a catastrophe for everyone.

Conclusion: Since the military resolution of conflicts is destructive and unproductive of peace, the development of insights and capacities for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and cooperation belongs on the agenda of the world community. This necessity must become the basis of policy. Civil conflict management is a primary task for the future—and not only for the directly warring parties, but also for all who want to help mediate from outside.

## **II. What Does Civil Conflict Management Mean and Comprise?**

Civil conflict management (CCM) means that the parties to the conflict enter into a rela-

tionship with each other, work sustainably for a constructive solution benefiting all partici-

pants, and start a dialog and negotiate with each other.

Accordingly, it comprises:

- ⇒ managing conflicts without military threat and deployment, that is, conceiving them in relation to their causes' contexts, seeking possibilities of solution and introducing appropriate processes;
- ⇒ promoting the transformation of conflicts from the military to the political plane;
- ⇒ carrying out a policy of cooperation, of mutual respect, and of the readiness to dialog and reconciliation;
- ⇒ seeking—including through unilateral steps and concessions—trust for the general good;
- ⇒ shaping proposals in such a way that they can be acceptable to all participants and possibly benefiting all;
- ⇒ informing and including all involved protagonists on the social, national, and international levels;
- ⇒ the normative orientation to human and minority rights in all their political, social, and cultural dimensions, and the normative orientation to cross-cultural ethical norms as well as to giving priority to the satisfaction of basic human needs above all other interests;
- ⇒ contributing to the overcoming of direct violence, but also of structural violence, which is expressed in poverty and hunger and is often ensured by violence.

The approach to be practiced with CCM is perhaps best expressed in Mahatma Gandhi's *Satyagraha* norms:

*Give a positive content to struggle! Do not extend the goals of the struggle! Trust your enemy! Meet the enemy personally! Be ready to compromise! Direct your struggle against the substance, not against the person! Do not take advantage of the weakness of the enemy! Do not provoke the enemy! Choose means that correspond to the goal! Do not depend on help from outside! Be ready to sacrifice! Try to see the point of view of the enemy! Do not hide your plans! Admit your errors! Deprive the enemy of the object of action! Do not practice sabotage! Be loyal!*<sup>5</sup>

CCM does not start with a naïve, idealized image of people, but relies on people's capacity to learn in order to survive and shape their own lives. It not only relates to the form of conflict resolution but also to the concrete content of the conflict, for which ethically acceptable solutions have to be found. As in the case of military conflict resolution, there is in CCM a relationship between the employed means and the achievable goals (ends-means relation). Military means the strengthening of hatred and enmity, as we could observe in the last decade for example in Iraq and Afghanistan.

CCM methods can promote empathy, cooperation and reconciliation and thereby also improve the conditions of life of the parties to the conflict. Since this applies to the majority of the population, the latter has to take part in the CCM dialog and be able to influence it. If the CCM dialog is only conducted by the elites there is a danger that the interests of the elites will prevent improvement in the living conditions of the population. The question of the overcoming of structural violence through CCM is accordingly closely tied to the inclusion of the disadvantaged social forces and to the possibility that they will gain from the resolution of the conflict.

<sup>5</sup> See Andreas Buro, "Meine Erfahrungen mit den 'Satyagraha-Normen' von Johan Galtung und Arne Naess nach Gandhi" [My Experience with the 'Satyagraha Norms' of Johan Galtung and Arne Naess according to Gandhi], in: Reiner Steinweg and Ulrike Laubenthal (eds.), *Gewaltfreie Aktion* [Non-violent Action], Frankfurt a.M. 2011, pp. 174-185.

### III: To Which Political Institutions Can Civil Conflict Management Relate?

After wars which ended with victory and defeat or which could not be continued due to the depletion of both sides, there came—if not chaos—the hour of negotiations. Diplomatic talks began, which as a rule were civil, but not marked by the spirit of reconciliation and the readiness of the opponents to cooperate. Determining factors were rather the final relations of force and the prospects of new alliances which could enable revenge. To be sure, there were exceptions to this rule. It is said of Emperor Frederick II that he deferred to the Pope's wish that he lead a crusade to the Holy Land. There—according to tradition, perhaps only a myth—he did not fight but came to an agreement with the Sultan's representative over a game of chess on a peaceful access to Jerusalem. However, Frederick subsequently resolved other conflicts with the force of arms.

*Constitutions, laws, case law, institutions of checks and balances, and procedural provisions* in the internal relations of domains and states have been able, under certain circumstances, to limit arbitrary rule. Courts adjudicate issues involving antagonists according to the applicable law in each situation. However, such instruments have always been expressions both of the overcoming of previous social relations of domination and the establishment of new ones. Ancient Athens, always praised as the cradle of democracy, differentiated between free and unfree citizens; the latter were ostracized from the democracy of the city state. The European nobility frequently were subject to a jurisdiction different from that of the peasant and urban population. But, above all, through the legal order people became serfs and slaves, the latter often being treated as private property.

*International treaties and international law* play a significant role in the civil resolution of conflicts,

especially if the antagonists submit to the jurisdiction of an international instance. One thinks, for example of the determination of territorial waters of coastal countries, which then receive exclusive rights to the fishing and exploitation of the mineral resources of the sea within their territory.

*Multinational regional accords*, for example those of the EU or the ASEAN countries, play an important role in overcoming mutual military threat and the arms race. Since these countries continually dialog on questions of common or differing interests, they are more strongly oriented to cooperation than confrontation. However, this does not concern their relations to those outside the regional accord, where militarily supported policy still plays a role.

Among the global accords, the UN has a special place. With its founding in spring 1945 in San Francisco and the signing of the UN Charter by representatives of 50 countries, a new attempt was launched, after the collapse of the League of Nations, to overcome the scourge of war and peacefully regulate conflicts. The Charter, in Chapter VI, commits the countries to the peaceful settlement of disputes and provides in Article 33, Paragraph 1 that:

*The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.*

In the case of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when the Cold War was in danger of leading to nuclear war, Article 33 preserved the peace.

At that time the UN Secretary General, Sithu U Thant, turned to the Security Council, urgently requested negotiations, and informed the UN of his own activities. He appealed to Kennedy and Khrushchev to consent to a two- to three-week moratorium, and to Cuban President Castro to halt the construction of military installations, travelled to Havana to talk with Castro and served as Kennedy's and Khrushchev's mediator, communicating messages and buying time. Later the US and Soviet negotiators thanked the Secretary General in a joint letter in which they assured him of their common appreciation for his mediation efforts. Such thanks were and are unusual, because as a rule the parties to the conflict claim success for themselves alone and mediators are normally sworn to confidentiality. This also explains why the UN receives so little recognition for its real contributions to peace.<sup>6</sup>

The great weight of the Security Council, provided for by the Charter, has proven to be a problem for civil conflict management by the UN. The dialog occurring there was, soon after the organization's founding, blocked by the Cold War between East and West and later through the power of vetoes, which could derail common decisions with a single vote. The history of military conflicts after 1945 and the enormous arms race show that the UN Security Council had little success in the area of peace making, although it could at times prevent the

escalation of conflicts through the deployment of UN peacekeeping troops. Together with the Secretary General and the General Assembly, however, several sub-organizations of the UN are seeking to carry out their peace-keeping mission in the sense of CCM in many domains through dialog methods.

CCM and its representatives can also refer to religious, philosophical and ethical considerations, which are documented in all religions and cultures. In Christianity, they can point to "love of one's neighbor," indeed even love of one's enemy, as well as the distinction made between perpetrator and deed, and also to various living practices, for example that of the Quakers; in Islam they can point to the idea of common existence and sharing with the poor. They can invoke Immanuel Kant's essay "Perpetual Peace" and his exposition of the conditions of peace as well as the meaning of tolerance in the play *Nathan the Wise* by Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. They can also refer to the tradition of non-violent conflict resolution and resistance associated with the teachings of Mahatma Gandhi, as well as the struggle of the US civil rights movement against racial segregation led by Martin Luther King. In the Muslim world too there is by now a plethora of experiences in non-violent uprisings, most recently with the Arab Spring. It is crucial to be aware of this experience in the Islamic world.<sup>7</sup>

## **Perspectives on Civil Conflict Management: I. The State of Civil Conflict Management in Contemporary International Politics**

The uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, in which there was an attempt to protest and demonstrate non-violently despite repressive state violence, have elicited much admiration and drawn

the attention of the public to non-violence and CCM. This was also true for a long time of the Syrian opposition, where demonstrators, due

<sup>6</sup> Bertrand G. Ramcharan, *Preventive Diplomacy at the UN*, 2008.

<sup>7</sup> Stephen Zunes, "Nonviolence in the Islamic World", in: *Nonviolent Activist: Magazine of the War Resister's League*, 1/2002.

to their non-violent principles, even refused foreign military intervention on their behalf. Syrian military deserters who took up armed struggle against the terrorist regime nevertheless called the non-violence of the popular uprising into question. The non-violent behavior was all the more astounding, in that in these three countries there were no long-standing efforts by a peace movement on behalf of a CCM culture. It is certain that in the early preparations for the popular uprising against the Mubarak dictatorship Gene Sharp's guidelines *From Dictatorship to Democracy*,<sup>8</sup> transmitted through peace activists from Belgrade who had worked against Milosevic's rule there, played an important role.

Since the more violent conflicts today are predominantly carried out inside countries, CCM has to stand the test in domestic crises. This in no way means that the grave crises and wars in a global context can be neglected; for even if there are less of them in number, the consequences of an international conflict are massive and of long duration.

CCM indicates an approach to conflicts as well as a peace-policy practice. In the examples used in the following stocktaking of this practice, which are overwhelmingly concentrated in single projects, a distinction will be drawn between domestic and international conflicts.

In view of the great number of CCM projects, single projects "from below" will be presented as examples; such projects are being carried out by numerous NGOs in many parts of the world.

## **Domestic Conflicts**

The Civil Peace Service (Forum Ziviler Friedensdienst or ZFD) arose in 1996 in the context of the German peace movement. It works by

sending trained people to trouble spots within Germany (where municipal conflict counseling is mostly involved) as well as abroad.<sup>9</sup> The ZFD groups consist of 10-20 well-trained persons.

Central to the "Western Balkans" program are projects of coming to terms with the past and dialog across ethnic borders. The kinds of action involved include the strengthening and networking of political initiatives for coming to terms with the past, which aim at a constructive public discussion, as well as the promotion of inter-ethnic dialog in the educational system.

Since 1999, the "Israel and Palestine" program has involved the construction of dialogue structures and the promotion of peace education. In Lebanon since 2009, the *Forum ZFD*, together with the Society for International Cooperation, has built a new program whose goal is to deal with past conflicts as well as provide counseling and training support in CCM. Together with three local organizations, the history of non-violent resistance in Lebanon has been documented.

On the Philippine island Mindanao, where conflicts have lasted for 40 years, various peace and human-rights groups as well as civil-society networks are being promoted.

For all of its activities (including the Training Academy), the Forum had a budget of approximately 4.4 million euros. By way of comparison: According to SIPRI, the military budget of the Federal Republic of Germany amounted to approximately 34 billion euros.

As an illustration of the various forms of action, we can mention the Committee for Fundamental Rights and Democracy's project "Vacation from War," which has been carried

<sup>8</sup> Gene Sharp, *From Democracy to Dictatorship: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation*, Bangkok 1994.

<sup>9</sup> Forum ZFD, *Geschäftsbericht 2010. Entwicklung und Finanzen im Überblick* [Annual Report 2010. An Overview of Development and Financing], Bonn 2011.

on annually since 1994. In the beginning the goal was to bring together children from warring ethnicities to the Balkans, on the Adriatic coast, for the purpose of overcoming racist enemy images.

At first, Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats came; later Kosovar Albanians as well. By 2011 there were well over 20,000 children and youth participants who got to know each other through play and learned to value each other. In the framework of this action, young people from Israel and Palestine were later invited to a joint meeting. From these activities there arose follow-up projects in the countries of origin.

Another form of civil intervention in domestic conflicts consists of the *elaboration, publication, and diffusion of concepts* regarding how particular conflicts can be de-escalated and dealt with. These interventions initiate a political dialogue on alternatives to the military and make the public aware of the frequently missed opportunities for peace. An example is the Monitoring Project and within it the dossier on the Turkish-Kurdish conflict.<sup>10</sup> The editorial states:

*In October 2006, the guerrillas called for a new unlimited cessation of hostilities. The EU states are nevertheless adhering to their terrorism accusation regarding the PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party] and its organizations and are thus throwing away the opportunity to intervene as mediators in the conflict. It is necessary to prevent a further escalation of the violent conflict and to settle it by civil means. In so doing, national, international and non-governmental entities could make their contribution. The European experiences with national minorities—for example the 1971 Austro-Italian Treaty on South Tyrol—should also be called on.*

The dossier contains a road map for the solution of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. This road map advocates unilateral steps that create trust, reduce fear and can induce the other side

in each case to take similar steps. An important role is played by the ending of the war through the readiness of the Kurdish side to hand in their weapons under international supervision and to thus transform the conflict, as well as Ankara's declaration of intent to aim at a policy of reconciliation and to carry out a comprehensive amnesty. The EU states should seriously try to provide help for the resolution of the conflict and drop their terrorism accusation against the Kurdish side, recognizing that what is also involved is resistance to the Turkish policy of forced assimilation.

*On-site CCM between the parties to the conflict* is another form of civil intervention. An example is the manifold and longstanding attempts of foundations, research institutes, and NGOs to de-escalate and transform the conflict between Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka and finally to reach a peaceful resolution of the conflict. On the German side, it was the Berghof Foundation that was especially involved. Despite great efforts, the attempt of the government in Colombo to win by militarily liquidating the Tamil Tigers finally prevailed, through which subjugation could be achieved but not the resolution of the conflict. Many CCM mediators even had to leave the country. This example shows that the efforts on behalf of CCM by NGOs in a country with domestic conflicts by no means always have the support of the ambassadors of their home countries.<sup>11</sup> The latter were possibly more interested in the stability of the existing rule than in the peaceful resolution of the conflicts.

*Where were there direct efforts by states to mediate domestic conflicts through CCM as understood here?* In the overcoming of apartheid in South Africa, the industrialized great powers, for example, played a rather negative role, among them Germany. And interventions

<sup>10</sup> Andreas Buro, *Monitoring-Projekt. Dossier III: Der türkisch-kurdische Konflikt*, Bonn, 2007. This publication complemented the work carried out by the Dialogue Circle for many years.

<sup>11</sup> Norbert Ropers, *A Systemic Approach: Reflections on Sri Lanka*, 2011, [www.berghof-handbook.net/documents/publications/ropers\\_handbookII.pdf](http://www.berghof-handbook.net/documents/publications/ropers_handbookII.pdf).

were often connected to partiality for one partner in the conflict or—as in Libya—even combined with military support. Where was the support for transformation processes in the Arab Spring, either through the acceptance of refugees or through investments and measures that would have had positive influence on the development of the social question?

In post-conflict situations, foreign action is primarily directed toward building up the so-called security sector. In the foreground there is the buildup of the military and police, the secret services, the securing of the state's monopoly on violence, etc. This seldom has anything to do with CCM.

*On the level of international organizations* the UN takes first place. After the end of the East-West conflict it carried out an important change of direction toward timely, preventive conflict management. The point of departure was the *Agenda for Peace*, which was published by then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992. Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and consolidation were the main pillars of this new orientation. However, the tools also included the intervention of UN troops. Even if its underlying conception was not pacifist, the Agenda still contained many interesting initiatives in the sense of CCM. In the framework of the Agenda, the Department of Political Affairs was founded as the main division of the UN Secretariat with the task of issuing early warning of threatening escalating conflicts. Boutros-Ghali's successor, Kofi Anan, pursued this orientation further and spoke of a "culture of prevention."

The initiative PRO UNCOPAC, which arose from German civil society, has set itself the goal of an ambitious and long-term project: the establishment of a subsidiary organ of the UN General Assembly—a UN Commission on Peace and Crisis Prevention. An exemplary statute was worked out, which attracted great interna-

tional interest from the start. In what followed, Germany's Forum Crisis Prevention endeavored to bring proposals into the public political discussion and arrange for the participation of people from as many countries as possible in its work for civil crisis prevention. In 2005 the UN voted to establish a Peace Building Commission for post-conflict situations. The Forum Crisis Prevention is now concerned with other initiatives aimed at extending the mandate of this Commission to proactive prevention with the active cooperation of civil society. The Commission, supported by a staff of scientists and conflict-management practitioners in cooperation with civil society and the existing early-warning institutions, would thus have the task of working out detailed recommendations for a timely non-military treatment of regional crisis by the United Nations. One could also imagine the emergence in many countries as well as in the EU of such commissions, so that a multi-tiered CCM system could develop, which goes from the local and national levels through the regional to the global level and pools experiences.

Despite all the positive developments on the path to CCM, we ought nevertheless to remember that the UN Security Council still has to make the final decision on the deployment of instruments.<sup>12</sup> In it (alleged) national interests play a decisive role, especially those of nations with veto power. As in Germany, with its civilian-military cooperation (CIMIC), there is, in addition, always a danger, on the global level, of the hijacking of the idea of peace and of CIMIC by the established military-oriented institutions. On the UN level, this tendency has worked to impede the Agenda for Peace from being satisfactorily put into practice. In 1995 Andreas Zumach already wrote:

*In media opinion, the UN is mostly spoken of in an undifferentiated way—especially if the reporting is on failures and errors as in Somalia, ex-Yugosla-*

---

<sup>12</sup> See UN, *Reports of the Security Council*.

*via or Rwanda. This representation misappropriates the responsibility of the single member states, which, with their often conflicting interests and highly differentiated political, economic and military capacities for influence, determine the policies of the UN. The UN as an autonomously acting subject does not exist.<sup>13</sup>*

*Subsidiary organs of the UN* play a significant role in the work of the UN. They are as a rule not directly involved in the de-escalation and resolution of violent conflicts, but rather deal with the conditions for resolution and the repercussions of military conflict resolution. In fulfilling their tasks, the UN's subsidiary organizations have to be interested in peaceful conditions and thus also in the peaceful civil management of conflicts. In this respect, the names of the following organizations speak for themselves:

- ⇒ Economic Commission for Africa
- ⇒ Food and Agriculture Organization
- ⇒ Global Programme on Globalization, Liberalization and Sustainable Human Development
- ⇒ International Labour Organization
- ⇒ United Nations Children's Fund
- ⇒ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
- ⇒ United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
- ⇒ United Nations Environment Programme
- ⇒ United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
- ⇒ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

- ⇒ UN System Network on Rural Development and Food Security
- ⇒ UN Women—United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women

The constant request for donations for the humanitarian-oriented subsidiary organizations shows how scarce the resources for their work are. The more it is possible to substitute CCM for military conflict resolution, the greater can be the savings in the military sectors and the greater can be the hope of the subsidiary organizations that the readiness of the UN's member states to adequately fund these organizations will grow.

## International Conflicts

According to the above-mentioned Conflict Barometer of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, the number of international conflicts has dwindled. But these do include wars of intervention, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the conflict between Israel and Palestine.

*Social movements and NGOs* have always protested against wars and the participation of their own countries in them. This was effective in the U.S. war of intervention in Vietnam and strengthened the readiness in Washington to contemplate a peaceful solution to this war and finally to negotiate. The Federal Republic of Germany was not directly involved in this war. Nevertheless, it was important to promote among its population a rejection of the war and therefore a critical attitude to militarily supported policies, even if this meant criticism of an alliance partner. This had its effect during the U.S.' and NATO's war of intervention in Afghanistan. It was rejected by about two-thirds of the German population, which demanded the withdrawal of the Bundeswehr from Afghanistan

<sup>13</sup> Andreas Zumach, *Vereinte Nationen* [The United Nations], Reinbek 1995, p. 8.

and a peaceful negotiated solution. As a consequence it was possible to articulate a critical attitude to this war in some media.

To convince public opinion, it was important to be able to submit for public discussion a civil alternative for managing the conflict. Once again the work of the Monitoring Project<sup>14</sup> proved to be exemplary, in whose framework the CCM alternatives not only to the Turkish-Kurdish and the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts but also to the Iran and Afghanistan wars was elaborated.

Where it is financially and logistically possible, cross-border peace work is still being done. Along with important humanitarian aid, it consisted in the Balkan Wars of support for local peace groups, the construction of mediation groups and the creation of international contacts of very diverse types, for example between schools and municipalities.

*On the state level*, CCM is hardly visible as a policy guideline. The Oslo Peace Process is a questionable example. It arose in the framework of NGO workshops and in the end led, via secret parallel negotiations, to an agreement on a declaration of principles (Oslo I), signed on September 13, 1993, by Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat in Washington in the presence of Bill Clinton. According to it, the Israeli government was supposed to gradually cede territory and political powers to the Palestinian Authority (PA) that was to be established. The central questions of the status of Jerusalem, the future of the settlements, the drawing of borders, etc. were to be clarified in "permanent status negotiations" after a five-year interim period. After the 1995 Interim Agreement (Oslo II), this pro-

cess was supposed to be brought to a conclusion by 1999.

The Palestinian Administration was completely successful in the interim period in creating the basic structures of a national state, although its authority continued to be geographically and legally strongly restricted. At the end of the interim period the PA only had sole competence in 10% of the West Bank and in 60% of the Gaza Strip for self-government, domestic order, and security. Moreover, Israel continued to press ahead with the construction of settlements. After the assassination of Rabin in 1995 Israel did not fulfill its Oslo II obligations, and the USA did not continue vigorously to pursue its mediation efforts.

An important development on the state level is the *formation of regional federations*. They arose out of the hope for economic advantages, for example economic development through free trade among the countries involved, and a strengthening of the region's weight in international negotiations. The EU often served as a model, although the problems were often highly specific. Alongside the EU, we can mention the Association of East Asian Nations (ASEAN), South America's Common Market of the South (Mercosur), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as well as the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC), with 57 states in which Islam is the state religion or the religion of the majority or of a large minority of the population. Such regional amalgamations of states have the great advantage of tending to exclude military conflict resolutions and of having the capacity to regulate problems through dialog. However, their foreign policy behavior is fully militarily backed.

*The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe* (OSCE) was founded after the end of the East-West conflict in 1994, succeeding the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Eu-

<sup>14</sup> Andreas Buro, *Das Monitoring-Projekt. Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung – Gewalt- und Kriegsprävention. Die Alternativen der Friedensbewegung zum militärischen Konfliktaustrag*. [The Monitoring Project. Civil Conflict Management—The Prevention of Violence and War. The Peace Movement's Alternatives to Military Conflict Resolution]. Bürgerinnen- und Bürgerinformation. Published by Kooperation für den Frieden, Bonn 2006.

rope (CSCE). Fifty-six states from Europe, Asia and North America belong to it, along with 11 additional cooperation partners. Its areas of responsibility comprise early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict follow-up. The OSCE is by now maintaining 19 field operations in 17 countries. This is where most of its staff works. It projects itself as pursuing, within the political-military dimension of security, a broadly conceived approach with emphases on arms control, border management, counter-terrorism, conflict prevention, military reforms and policing.

At first, there was the hope that the OSCE would give rise to an institution spanning East and West, whose structures would lead to a system of "common security" in all of Europe and perhaps beyond. This hope has not been fulfilled, since instead of this NATO has carried on a policy of absorbing former member states of the Warsaw Pact into a military pact. As a result the OSCE has lost a lot of its meaning. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that it will regain meaning in the future.

Our stocktaking of CCM in the context of international politics includes pointing to the remarkable *development of peace research*. This has spread throughout the whole world in the last 50 years, with research institutes and international associations. The research interests are very diverse substantively and regionally. For a long time analyses and critiques of deterrence policy, military strategies, arms control, defense systems, and the question of disarmament were at the center of research. After the end of the East-West conflict the focus shifted primarily to systems of collective security and how to deal with domestic conflicts. Along with this the new unipolar power structure that remained after the collapse of the system of bilateral threat was analysed. Increasingly, the topic of pacifism has become the focus of discussion and with it the question of how the expected conflicts can be peacefully and civilly managed. In this con-

text the pacifist tradition of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. and the later theories of Theodor Ebert on "social defense" were repeatedly drawn on. Dieter Senghaas has shown how much CCM must concern itself with the emergence of socio-political and socio-cultural conditions in order to increase the chances for a constructive culture of conflict.<sup>15</sup> Johan Galtung's proposals for the possibilities of a "transformation of conflict" from the violent to the political level played a large role in this.<sup>16</sup> It received a broad discussion in peace research circles through the international network Transcend.<sup>17</sup> Another method of the problem resolution workshop essentially goes back to Herbert Kelman and was taken up in the Federal Republic especially by the Berghof Foundation, which made an important contribution to analyses and reports on principles and cases of CCM.<sup>18</sup> A great many others have also contributed to the study of Civil Conflict Management. Volker Matthies, for example, has presented CCM experiences in his books on the end of the East-West conflict.<sup>19</sup> The Institute for Peace Education (Institut für Friedenspädagogik) in Tübingen is developing analyses and materials that can be deployed domestically and in development cooperation. In this connection we should mention the exhibition project developed in cooperation with

15 Dieter Senghaas, "Der Frieden und seine Erforschung. Bilanz eines halben Jahrhunderts Friedensforschung" [Peace and its Study. Balance Sheet of a Half Century of Peace Research]. In: *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, 12/2010, pp. 85-94.

16 Johan Galtung, *Konflikte und Konfliktlösungen. Die Transcend-Methode und ihre Anwendung* [Conflicts and Conflict Resolution. The Transcend Method and its Application]. Globale Analyse vol. 3. Werder (Havel) 2007.

17 Transcend, A Peace and Development Network for Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means.

18 Berghof Forschungszentrum für konstruktive Konfliktbearbeitung, *A Systemic Approach to Conflict Transformation. Exploring Strengths and Limitations*. Berghof Handbook, Berlin 2008.

19 See for example Volker Mathies, *Krisenprävention. Vorbeugen ist besser als Heilen* [Crisis Prevention. Prevention is Better Than Curing], Opladen 2000; idem (ed.), *Vom Krieg zum Frieden: Kriegsbeendigung und Friedenskonsolidierung* [From War to Peace: Ending Wars and Consolidating the Peace]. Schriftenreihe des Wissenschaftlichen Forums für Internationale Sicherheit e.V., vol. 8.

journalists with its three dimensions—Peace Counts on Tour, Peace Counts School and Peace Counts Universities—in which the successful examples of peace action are documented, analyzed, disseminated, and networked.<sup>20</sup> Other

institutions and contexts from the milieu of the peace movement have also worked in this sense and reiterated the demand to expand research on CCM as an alternative to military conflict resolution.

## II. Resistance to Civil Conflict Management That Must Be Reckoned With

The resolution of conflicts and pursuit of interests with military violence has a long tradition in the history of humanity. Social and economic groups have benefited from them. Systems of rule have been built on them. Administrative institutions and research continue to depend on arms-industry interests. Worldwide military expenditures for 2010 totaled \$1.63 trillion US dollars, according to the SIPRI manual (2011). This enormous sum makes clear how strong the interest groups favoring military conflict resolution are. The USA's share is 43%. Next comes China with 7.3%, Great Britain with 3.7%, France and Russia with 3.6% each, Japan with 3.3%, Saudi Arabia neck and neck with Germany at 2.8%, India with 2.5%, and Italy, 2.3%, with the lowest percentage among the top 10.

U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned in his farewell address on January 17, 1961, about those whose interests are closely tied to the logic of military conflict resolution, designating them as the *military-industrial complex*. He saw in their activity a danger for American democracy and also feared that its activity could lead to the will to solve world political problems militarily rather than politically. His warning applies even more today than it did 50 years ago: the

institutions of the military, of industry, research and the arms industry are highly intertwined with each other and resist any demilitarization of politics, mostly with the assent of their employees (who are often organized in trade unions). Also the majority of political parties still think in traditional military-oriented power categories.

All these powers have great financial means at their disposal for lobbying and media work in favor of a policy of military threat of violence. In this way it is possible for them to frighten political institutions and public opinion through an alarmist security ideology.

Many conflicts rest on structural violence, which enables oppression, exploitation, and expropriation. And in the end it rests on the capacity to deploy manifest violence to uphold the existing domination and property order at home and abroad. In this sense the Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm IV wrote in reference to the German bourgeois revolution of 1848/49: "The only thing that helps against democracy is soldiers." This naturally leads to resistance to demilitarization and CCM.

However, resistance to military conflict resolution and a turn to civil conflict management also result from *traditional thinking in societies*. The conception, reinforced by nationalism, that one's own military is good, makes it acceptable in society to regard one's own military as the

<sup>20</sup> Günther Gugel and Uli Jäger, *Global Handeln für Frieden und Entwicklung* [Act Globally for Peace and Development]. Verein für Friedenspädagogik e.V., 1999; Günther Gugel, *Gewalt und Gewaltprävention* [Violence and the Prevention of Violence], Verein für Friedenspädagogik, 2006.

*ultima ratio*, even as a desirable instrument for guaranteeing national security—even though a glance at history, and not only at Germany history, teaches the opposite lesson. In Germany, the heated discussion on the role of the Wehrmacht in World War II showed how difficult it is for many people to perceive their own barbarization through war. Fifty years after the end of the Second World War large parts of the population reacted indignantly at the representations of the brutalities perpetrated by the Wehrmacht in their campaign against the Soviet Union.

The *legitimation ideologies of just war* and of *humanitarian intervention* are still effective. They are highly significant for the support for militarily based policy, because they portray it as humane and thereby foreclose criticism. The intention is to signal to the population that the application of military force is justified by higher values. Thus the application of force is euphemistically justified as “collateral damage,” with its usually far-reaching and deeply entrenched suffering and destruction. It is, moreover, depicted as being without alternative.

The concept of “just war” goes back to the 4<sup>th</sup> century, when the ecclesiastical and secular powers turned to each other. The original Christian refusal to serve in the military lost its force. “Just war” was meant to dispose people to participate in war.

*To the degree that the Emperor mediated and made possible the Church's participation in political power, with whose help it could realize its claim to monopoly and suppression of heretics, he could also expect legitimation and support on the part of the Church for his exercise of power. This altered situation is codified in the doctrine of just war.<sup>21</sup>*

Asserting the possibility of “just war” had the character of a legitimation ideology from the

very beginning, which in its various forms still has a strong hold on the consciousness of society.

In historical perspective and on closer inspection it is difficult to find a war which corresponds to the criteria of “just war.” Certainly, the war waged by the Allies against the Nazi dictatorship was justified as a defensive war against a German military carrying out the systemic liquidation of whole peoples. But even this war did not unconditionally fulfill the criteria of a humanitarian intervention; it was not deployed to save the Jewish population, nor the Roma and Sinti or the communists and socialists in the concentration camps and was not aimed at saving all other threatened people, in or outside of Germany.

The *Responsibility to Protect/R2P*, passed by the UN in 2005, is double-edged. On the one hand, it creates the possibility of protecting groups of people in a timely way, and with civil means, from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. On the other hand, it can legitimize military intervention exercised by strong powers for reasons quite different from that of the protection of people. The NATO intervention in Libya, which was overwhelmingly about regime change, shows this manifest danger.

Media reports can also become an obstacle to the use of civil conflict management. If they are embedded in the information policy of governments, they can legitimize militarily-based policy and lead to the ignoring of civil conflict management processes. Many journalists are unprepared for the demands of a conflict-sensitive journalism and for an understanding of civil conflict management processes, although even here there has been progress with the development of peace journalism.

<sup>21</sup> *Evangelisches Staatslexikon*, Stuttgart 1987, 3rd edition, pp. 1873-1874.

### III. Strategies and Elements of Civil Conflict Management

The transformation from military to civil conflict management can happen in a long process, since the massive interests tied to armaments and the military, the groups supporting them, and traditional thinking in the form of violence and counter-violence are very strong. Criticism of and protest against armaments and war, as well as the laying bare of the consequences and crimes of war, have to be linked to an effort to explain and realize CCM. These are two sides of the same coin, which must always be coordinated.

This paper is about CCM in the context of international politics. In this connection, not only inter-country wars are treated but also internal civil wars with a danger of escalation, in which other states or groups intervene in a partisan or arbitrating way.

Nevertheless, we must never forget how important the practice of CCM is within societies for the formation of a culture of peace. If the conflicts in families, in school, in work, and one's own area of life were to be treated in the name and with the criteria of CCM, this would simultaneously be an extension of the understanding of an insightful and non-violent way of dealing with conflicts, which could also have its effect on the way international conflicts are judged. The numerous initiatives to train students to become conflict arbitrators and mediators represent an important preliminary work for the emergence of a culture of peace.

The already mentioned Conflict Barometer of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research reported 363 conflicts in 2010. Some of the parties to the conflicts met for talks, negotiations, or congresses. The number of such meetings came to about 164. Of these, 19 involved severe conflicts and wars, 73 conflicts with sporadic use of violence, and 72

conflicts that up to then had been carried out without violence. 130 of these meetings did not lead to formally established results. In the case of violently escalated conflicts, the parties in 10 cases finally came to agreements, while 9 such attempts failed. Interestingly, a total of 26 conflicts negotiations led to 34 treaties, indeed to peace treaties, four ceasefire agreements, and 10 compromises on contested issues. The other agreements had to do with rules of conduct, judicial verdicts, or were memoranda of understanding. The Conflict Barometer contains more detailed information on the individual conflicts, which we cannot explore here. Important for CCM, however, is the fact that in some conflicts civil efforts at de-escalation were successful.

Since CCM has to be concerned with preventing the violent escalation of conflicts, an important focus for their work on conflicts has to be on those at a lower level of escalation. In the case of these conflicts, CCM faces less wish for militarily-based policy and decisions by way of military threat or by military intervention. CCM can thus best develop its special capacities here. However, to do so important preconditions have to be created.

*The training of personnel* for CCM is an essential precondition for the availability of relevant help in conflicts on a lower level of escalation not just in a few places but throughout an entire region. In addition to core training, as has already been done by Germany's Civil Peace Service, training for specific country and conflict situations must be offered so that cultural particularities can be taken into account.

The concept of CCM does not correspond to traditional pedagogic contents. Students are as a rule not made aware of CCM. However, there is special instructional material available, which has, for example, been published by the Insti-

tute for Peace and Education in Tübingen, often in cooperation with NGOs.<sup>22</sup> Pedagogues and the peace movement must see to it that these materials are used in instruction so that a counterweight to military propaganda is created.

Happily, in some countries, including Germany, in universities and peace-research centers *curricula for peace and conflict research* have been established. An example is at the University in Giessen, where for some years now Prof. Hanne-Margret Birckenbach has offered seminars on the Monitoring Project. Concepts for the civil resolution of conflicts are developed here by the students, which are then made public such that students are preparing projects not only to be archived but also for deployment in peace practice.

The CCM alternative should also be brought into government institutions. It is therefore to be hoped that *courses in CCM for the staff of governments and international institutions* are offered, that is, also for diplomats. In Switzerland and Austria there already are such courses. This involves not only the dissemination of knowledge but also the winning over of people in the institutions, who would then be committed to CCM.

*The training of journalists in peace journalism.* The communication of CCM work requires special training for media workers, as it presents much more difficult challenges than does war reporting. It is necessary to make the drama of CCM visible and also to deal with it as an issue in the cultural domain. Paraphrasing the UN Charter, the leitmotif could be: "The struggle to save humanity from the scourge of war." The dilemma in the case of reporting on CCM is obvious: Prevented wars meet with little public attention. The Secretary General of the OSCE said after the successful organizational work in Latvia and Estonia that there were no violent conflicts because the OSCE was so successful here.

However, precisely for this reason the media did not cover it, so that the public found out almost nothing about the successful civil conflict management. This is in fact a serious problem. For this reason part of the practice of CCM and crisis prevention always includes public discussion and energetic media work. It is necessary that journalists prepare themselves to follow the complicated and often tedious paths these processes take and are able to convey the drama of the process in their reports.<sup>23</sup>

For CCM, *experience has to be gathered, evaluated, and made accessible.* Such experience first arises in the context of smaller conflicts, in which external military intervention is not an issue. These are, or become, mostly domestic social confrontations over land use, water access, unresolved tribal conflicts, ethnic-nationalistically and religiously intensified quarrels, etc. The worldwide experience accumulated in mediation attempts should be thoroughly documented and appraised comparatively. It can thus become an important basis for education and continued education.

A central task of CCM is prevention. So that overlaps, competition, and possible incompatibility of the very different approaches may be avoided, and so that the diverse approaches can learn from each other, *an international clearing house* should be built in which activities are reported and can be called up. This would enable an understanding between the various groupings and at the same time create conditions for closer cooperation between the supposedly, many mostly CCM moderators. Prevention presupposes observation and analysis of potential conflict areas. But this in itself is not enough. Also necessary is the working out of preventive plans of action and the establishment of contact with persons who may be able to play a preventive or mediating role in each conflict, so that conflict management can begin

<sup>22</sup> [www.friedenspaedagogik.de](http://www.friedenspaedagogik.de).

<sup>23</sup> See the work of journalists in the Peace Counts network, [www.peace-counts.org](http://www.peace-counts.org).

before escalation, or perhaps a violent confrontation, takes place.

*Climate change* is an area in which civil prevention can develop. It will foreseeably have serious consequences for the inhabitants of certain areas. In such endangered regions there should be the timely establishment of talks in order to discuss common solutions, de-escalate antagonistic interests, and organize support for the needed projects. It is to be expected that this will be a matter of long-term projects needing very well qualified and patient mediators.

In conflicts in which military confrontations or threats play a central role, on-site mediation is often hardly possible or sensible. I can cite as an example the Afghan War, the Turkish-Kurdish conflict and the confrontations over the question of whether the Iranian leadership intends to produce nuclear weapons. Here, alongside protest, the outstanding task is to develop *concepts for the civil management of conflicts* in which the public is informed and discussion is made possible. The goal of such efforts is to break through the apparent lack of alternatives to military mutual strikes to show the political sector and the public how advantageous CCM can be.

In the context of such encounters, playing a role is the already mentioned monitoring project "Civil Conflict Management, Prevention of Violence and War." The concepts developed in this context can in fact be debated in all sectors of the directly or indirectly involved. Acceptance increases if the important governments stand completely or at least in part behind such a concept.

In some conflicts it is necessary to enable *confidential talks* between forces that cannot speak to each other officially.<sup>24</sup> In order to establish

relationships despite this official proscription, an exploration of the legitimate interests and possibilities of action of the other side can play just as important a role as the building of trust between important persons in each conflict. Confidential talks require neither public exposure nor final declarations. Their conditions should be shaped in a helpful way. Possibilities for translation and mediation have to be available. An independent mediation institution of this sort with appropriate financing possibilities, in which the informal meeting of parties to the conflict is possible, is exceedingly desirable. Not only politicians but also NGOs must have access to it.

The Center for International Peace Operations (Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze or ZIF) in the Federal Republic of Germany supervises civil forces in state interventions in the framework of EU, OSCE, and UN missions. NGOs, civil groupings, etc. will not want to integrate their projects in it, especially as long as ZIF envisages civil-military cooperation. Thus, for the follow-up and evaluation of experiences a newly created framework would have to be developed in which all can meet on an equal footing and exchange information. An international exchange of such experience is just as desirable as the evaluation of experiences for educational purposes. In the evaluation of operations it is imperative to evaluate negative experiences as well, in order to improve strategies. Negative experience and failures must by no means be suppressed.

*The regional UN Organization, the OSCE*, has not been able to fulfill the wide-ranging regulatory functions that it was originally intended to have in the period after the end of the East-West conflict. It has been largely pushed to the margins by NATO and its policy of expansion. Nevertheless, the OSCE dispatches long-term missions and names a High Commissioner on National Minorities. A policy that intends to carry out CCM could receive support from the OSCE in

<sup>24</sup> The need for this confidentiality points to a problem that arises from the striving for total transparency (as for example in the case of WikiLeaks).

view of its concrete field projects. For example, the OSCE has for years proven to be very open in Kyrgyzstan. It is therefore not impossible that the OSCE's cases of successful conflict prevention in the 1990s, for example in Estonia and Latvia in the context of the Baltic states' recovery of independence from the Soviet/Russian area of domination and the great number of Russians with an immigrant background, will have a sequel in another location.

The demand for *regional CSCE dialogs* leads to many topics. We already pointed to the importance of regional amalgamations in parts of the globe. They are not mainly defined in a peace-policy way but nevertheless promote the readiness to discuss inter-state problems in their circle of dialog and in so doing to not have recourse to the threat of violence. In any case, these alliances and the single cooperating states do not relinquish military-based policies in their foreign policy.

In the period of the East-West conflict the instrument of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was completely successful in the matter of the reduction of conflicts. Through this instrument a long phase of dialog on various issues ("baskets") was ushered in. This CSCE instrument could also have a model function for contemporary and future conflicts. For this reason the demand for and promotion of regional dialogs after the model of the CSCE should be a focus in the carrying out of CCM. These regional dialogs should not be conceived as single-issue events—for example about nuclear-weapon-free zones—but as in the CSCE model, deal with several issues in order to arrive, through small successes, to the building of trust. In this connection we can point to the domestically (and unfortunately not outwardly) directed cooperation in the framework of the EU, which works on its conflicts with a CCM approach.

Regional forms of cooperation are also found in alliances for *nuclear-weapon-free zones*. These

zones were agreed on between states which had no nuclear weapons, where the question of nuclear disarmament therefore did not arise. What was involved was rather a voluntary agreement not to aspire to possess one's own nuclear weapons in the future. By now such treaties exist for the Antarctic, Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Central Asia and Mongolia. Also in the Two-Plus-Four Treaty a nuclear-weapon-free zone for the area of unified Germany was agreed on. For the extension of CCM it could make sense, starting with these treaties, to propose and demand further demilitarization steps.

The UN, which according to its Charter is to serve for the peaceful solution of conflicts, has in the past been greatly weakened by the great power, not least by the U.S. (withholding of contribution payments, blocking through vetoes, violation of the UN Charter). Through its financial weakness and the lack of autonomous UN troops, the UN Security Council, in major conflicts, often gives a mandate to strong military powers and alliances, such as NATO, whose fulfillment the UN is hardly in a position to control. It thus becomes a rubber stamp of military-based policies, as recently in Libya. The initiatives of former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Agenda for Peace) for more peace-oriented policies could not prevail. Still, the UN was able to construct the Peace-Building commission and can dispatch Peacekeeping Missions. It remains to be seen whether from this perspective a *Corps for Civil Concept Management* could be set up. It would presumably not supplant the Blue-Helmet troops—at least not at first—but precisely in relation to small and middle-sized conflicts would be an important and internationally accepted force for CCM.

The above-mentioned *sub-organizations of the UN* work in many contexts and with many states in the world. We already explained how they could pursue their tasks in a peaceful, cooper-

actively oriented world society. Would it not be an important strategic directive to familiarize these sub-organizations and their projects with

the methods and spirit of CCM and to encourage and enable them to apply these methods in their practice?

## Conclusion

Since we cannot assume a rapid and complete change from military conflict resolution to civil conflict management, but rather can foresee a gradual transition, CCM has to concentrate on the areas in which it can demonstrate its capacities and can simultaneously build up institutions, procedures, and potentials. In this the great variety of protagonists and their different possibilities and potentials must be considered. All the steps named here, and more, can contribute:

- ⇒ To pushing back military conflict resolution, shifting more fields of action from its purview through international law and jurisdiction, and to making the high costs of armaments and intervention foster civil alternatives;
- ⇒ To the extension of the potential in states and societies, which are making efforts toward CCM and preventing war, and in so doing also gain weight in public recognition;
- ⇒ To the communicating of timely critical information on impending crises, the sparking of public debate, and the carrying out of energetic lobbying and media work connected to proposals on prevention and de-escalation;

- ⇒ Along with this an essential task for civil-society groups and media is the creation of a critical counter-public space in which societies develop a culture of peaceful conflict resolution—including for domestic conflicts—and make successful prevention and CCM, with its great advantage for people and economies, publicly visible in concrete cases.
- ⇒ In this way it is possible that staff of the national and international organizations can increasingly intervene with a CCM approach in order better to be able to fulfill their specific tasks.

Military conflict resolution means threat and confrontation. CCM means the building of trust and cooperation. Without cooperation the serious problems of the future of the international community of states cannot be solved. It is therefore necessary to promote a process which leads in practice to stronger prevention of violence and to CCM, which attracts continually more means and public attention to itself and from this acquires its own dynamic. We already see initiatives in this direction. The peace-oriented sections of civil society can play a considerable role in their expansion.

# GLOBAL NETWORK OF ROSA LUXEMBURG STIFTUNG OFFICES



## **NORTH AMERICA AND UNITED NATIONS**

New York City/USA  
Directors: Dr. Stefanie Ehmsen and  
Dr. Albert Scharenberg  
Website: [www.rosalux-nyc.org](http://www.rosalux-nyc.org)

## **MEXICO, CENTRAL AMERICA AND CUBA**

Mexico City/Mexico  
Director: Torge Löding  
Website: [www.rosalux.org.mx](http://www.rosalux.org.mx)

## **ANDEAN REGION**

Quito/Ecuador  
Director: Dr. Miriam Lang  
Website: [www.rosalux.org.ec](http://www.rosalux.org.ec)

## **SOUTH AMERICA**

São Paulo/Brasil  
Director: Gerhard Dilger  
Website: [www.rls.org.br](http://www.rls.org.br)

## **PALESTINE**

Ramallah  
Director: Peter Schäfer  
Website: [www.rosaluxemburg.ps](http://www.rosaluxemburg.ps)

## **ISRAEL**

Tel Aviv  
Director: Dr. Angelika Timm  
Website: [www.rosalux.co.il](http://www.rosalux.co.il)

## **GLOBAL HEADQUARTERS**

Berlin/Germany  
President: Dr. Dagmar Enkelmann  
Executive Director: Dr. Florian Weis  
Website: [www.rosalux.de](http://www.rosalux.de)

## **EUROPEAN UNION**

Brussels/Belgium  
Director: Dr. Klaus Sühl  
Website: [www.rosalux-europa.info](http://www.rosalux-europa.info)

## **EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE**

Warsaw/Poland  
Director: Dr. Joanna Gwiazdecka  
Website: [www.rls.pl](http://www.rls.pl)

## **SOUTHEAST EUROPE**

Belgrade/Serbia  
Director: Dr. Boris Kanzleiter  
Website: [www.rosalux.rs](http://www.rosalux.rs)

## **TURKEY**

Istanbul  
Director: Kadriye Karci  
Email: [karci@rosalux.de](mailto:karci@rosalux.de)

## **RUSSIA, CENTRAL ASIA AND CAUCASUS**

Moscow/Russia  
Director: Tiina Fahrni  
Website: [www.rosalux.ru](http://www.rosalux.ru)

## **EAST ASIA**

Beijing/China  
Director: Dr. Lutz Pohle  
Email: [pohle@rosalux.cn](mailto:pohle@rosalux.cn)

## **SOUTHEAST ASIA**

Hanoi/Vietnam  
Director: Nadja Charaby  
Website: [www.rosalux.vn](http://www.rosalux.vn)

## **SOUTH ASIA**

New Delhi/India  
Director: Dr. Carsten Krinn  
Email: [krinn@rosalux.de](mailto:krinn@rosalux.de)

## **WEST AFRICA**

Dakar/Senegal  
Director: Dr. Claus-Dieter König  
Website: [www.rosalux.sn](http://www.rosalux.sn)

## **EAST AFRICA**

Dar Es Salaam/Tanzania  
Director: Siegfried Schröder  
Email: [schroeder@rosalux.de](mailto:schroeder@rosalux.de)

## **SOUTHERN AFRICA**

Johannesburg/South Africa  
Director: Dr. Armin Osmanovic  
Website: [www.rosalux.co.za](http://www.rosalux.co.za)



Website: [www.rosalux-nyc.org](http://www.rosalux-nyc.org)

Facebook: [rosaluxnyc](https://www.facebook.com/rosaluxnyc)

Twitter: [@rosaluxnyc](https://twitter.com/rosaluxnyc)